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Abstract: History tells that institutions evolve gradually over 
time, pushing new ideas across borders and cultures. 
Globalisation is argued to accelerate this process. We examine 
the spatial links of different political institutions across borders. 
Applying various tests for spatial proximity, we do not find 
evidence of contemporaneous spatial links. This result is robust 
to various measures of distance and of cultural proximity across 
countries. Instead, when we analyse long run dynamics diffusion 
of institutions seems to occur only gradually. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Good institutions are crucial in setting off economic development. Empirical tests that relate 
indicators of institutional quality to economic growth confirm that good governance, i.e. an 
accountable government, rule of law, economic freedom, spurs economic growth (Hall and 
Jones, 1999). 
 
Institutions are the outcome of a conflict between various interests. The result depends on 
the de facto political power balance between these groups (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Different 
ways of resolving this political conflict shapes the way a country’s institutions develop over 
time. Institutional quality is not just determined by this domestic conflict, however. The 
winning group has to resolve a conflict with the winners in other countries too. This link is 
most obvious in episodes like wars or colonialism. History books are full of examples of 
conquerors imposing new structures and ideas on different cultures. Institutions also spread 
in less bloody ways. Common practices are often forced on countries through mutual 
exchanges, leading to a convergence in standards. Governments compete for foreign direct 
investment (Qiang and Roland, 1998). Traders and merchants exchange ideas and set 
common benchmarks (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2006). Governments learn from the 
experiences in other countries (Berkowitz et al., 2003). Migration makes governments refrain 
from adopting bad policies (Fleck and Hansen, 2005). Institutions are likely to spill from one 
country to another when some “link” ties the winning interest groups. These links may not 
only be geographical (due to low trading costs or easy migration), but also cultural (common 
traditions, religion or language) or economic (stage of development, trade). 
 
In this paper, we examine whether institutional indices are spatially correlated, and test this 
hypothesis on two well-known sets of indicators developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann et 
al., 2007), and the Fraser Institute respectively. In contrast to Keleijan et al. (2008), we do 
not detect contemporaneous spatial links between indicators of institutional quality. Our 
result is robust to various measures of geographic, economic and cultural links across 
countries. We do not find evidence of increased spillover in recent periods. Institutions, 
however, take time to develop, and consequently, also to affect neighbouring countries. We 
find some slight evidence of institutional spatial correlation when testing for changes in 
institutional quality allowing for such long run dynamics. 
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2. Spatial indicators 
 
Spatial autocorrelation occurs when the value of a variable at any one point in space 
depends on values at contiguous points. This spatial proximity between observations can be 
described with an exogenously specified weight matrix – call it W – that reflects the structure 
and intensity of these spatial links. 
 
There are three basic tests for spatial correlation. The Moran I test is defined as:  
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where xi and xj are the observations for units i and j; x  is the mean over the sample of 
observations; and wij is the i-j element of the row-standardised W matrix of weights. In (1), 
∑∑=
i j
ij0 wS  is a standardisation factor for the weights. A positive sign for I points to 
positive spatial correlation, meaning that similar values tend to be near each other. Negative 
spatial correlation means that different values are close. The null hypothesis of no spatial 
autocorrelation can be rejected if the test statistic exceeds the (normally distributed) critical 
value. 
The Getis Ord test identifies clusters of points with values higher in magnitude: 
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The higher (or lower) is G, the stronger the association between the observations. A test 
statistic near zero indicates no apparent concentration, and implies a random distribution of 
values in space. Finally, the Geary test indicates the cluster pattern of high/low values: 
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C falls in a range between 0 and 2, with 0 indicating strong positive spatial correlation, and 2 
negative correlation. Values vary around 1 indicate no spatial autocorrelation. 
3. Statistical evidence 
 
We use two well-know datasets of institutional indicators. First, the World Bank indicators 
(henceforth KKZ) measure the quality of political and economic institutions between 1998 
4 
and 2006, and cover six areas: (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, (iii) 
government effectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law, and (vi) control of corruption. 
Second, the slightly more economics oriented Economic Freedom index (henceforth EF) of 
the Fraser Institute quantifies institutions at 5 year intervals between 1970 and 2005 in five 
major areas: (i) size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises, (ii) legal structure 
and security of property rights, (iii) access to sound money, (iv) international trade, and (v) 
market regulation. 
 
We test spatial correlation with various weight matrices. The links can be geographical, 
where contiguity (common border dummy) or physical distance (great circle distance 
between country centroids) is a good proxy for the cost of diffusion. Alternatively, we directly 
choose some economic linkage, such as trade, or differences in countries’ stage of 
development proxied by GDP per capita. Finally, spatial links may depend on the ease of 
exchange across cultures. We use measures for linguistic diversity (fraction of English or 
European languages spoken), measures of fractionalisation and polarisation along ethnic or 
religious lines, and legal origin. 
 
Table 1 reports the p-values for the different spatial tests on the 5 main KKZ indices for the 
year 2000. We cannot reject the null that spatial correlation does not exist. This result is 
robust to the use of all measures of geographic, economic, or cultural channels. The results 
are unequivocally similar for the 5 main EF indices. 
 
The lack of spatial links between institutions is an extremely robust finding.2 First, results are 
similar for all years in the sample. Hence, there is no evidence that spillover has become 
stronger over time, due to globalisation, for example. Second, if we calculate the spatial tests 
for the entire set of indices, there still is no spatial correlation. Over the range spanned by the 
KKZ indices plus/minus two standard errors, there is no spatial link. The lack of spatial 
correlation might be due to aggregation over various sub-indices. The EF indices can be split 
up in 21 components, which in turn comprise several sub-components. We run the spatial 
test for each, but cannot find evidence of significant spillover for a single one. Third, linkages 
could be multidimensional. Economic and cultural links mutually reinforce each other. We 
capture this effect by multiplying the cultural weight matrix with bilateral trade (or GDP per 
capita). We still do not find evidence of institutional spillover. Finally, as spatial links could be 
more important for certain groups of countries, we repeat the tests for each continent (Africa, 
                                                 
2 These results are not reported but available upon request. 
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Asia and Europe), and a group of emerging or OECD economies. However, we can refute 
that linkages are stronger within regional groups. 
 
The spatial tests are static. However, institutions are very persistent over time (Hall and 
Jones, 1999) and the spillover mechanism may require time to develop through the different 
channels we proposed. We introduce these dynamics by testing spatial correlation on the 
difference in institutional quality over time. Only the EF index extends sufficiently back in time 
to examine a time span over which institutions can develop. In particular, we consider the 
change in the institutional indicator between 1980 and 2005, and use the weight matrix for 
the initial year. We still find little evidence of spatial links (Table 2). However, we do find 
some evidence of positive spatial correlation in the index of sound money. This indicates the 
growing similarity of monetary conditions on globalised financial markets over the nineties. 
Interestingly, when we use bilateral trade as the weight matrix, the legal structure index is 
highly spatially correlated. This may indicate that legal standards have slowly spilled over by 
forcing common practices on countries, their main channel being bilateral trade. This result is 
evidence in support of current practices in the institutional empirical literature that models 
spillover by focusing on long run dynamics (Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Bosker and 
Garretsen, 2006). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Although spillover in institutions is often implicitly recognised, we find no evidence that 
indicators of institutional quality are contemporaneously spatially correlated. Our result is 
good news for the literature examining the effects of institutional quality on economic 
development since their findings are not biased when implicitly ignoring spatial linkages. 
Diffusion of institutions across borders seems instead a long-run phenomenon. Some 
channels, trade in particular, may act in the long-run as a catalyst for standardisation in legal 
structure. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Tests for spatial correlation, KKZ data. 
weight matrix  voice and accountability 
political 
stability 
government 
effectiveness 
regulatory 
quality rule of law 
control of 
corruption 
border I 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.62 0.51 0.51 
 G 0.61 0.67 0.61 0.70 0.60 0.60 
 C 0.70 0.60 0.73 0.58 0.73 0.72 
distance I 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 G 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 
 C 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
trade a) I 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
 G 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 
 C 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.29 
GDP capita b) I 0.73 0.74 0.60 0.72 0.60 0.59 
 G 0.73 0.73 0.60 0.72 0.59 0.59 
 C 0.53 0.52 0.67 0.55 0.68 0.68 
legal origin I 0.87 0.89 0.83 0.91 0.82 0.79 
 G 0.87 0.89 0.83 0.91 0.81 0.79 
 C 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.38 0.45 0.47 
language c) I 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 G 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 
 C 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 
language fractionalisation d) I 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 
 G 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 
 C 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
ethnic fractionalisation e) I 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.94 
 G 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 
 C 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 
religion d) I 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 C 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 
religious fractionalisation d) I 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 C 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
religious polarisation f) I 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 C 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 
RQ polarisation h) I 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 C 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 
Notes: a) Frankel Romer trade index, b) Penn World Tables, c) fraction of English speaking population, d) Wacziarg et 
al. (2003), e) Easterly and Levine (1997), f) our measure based on fractions of main religions, i) Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) 
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Table 2. Tests for spatial correlation, EF data. 
  size of government legal structure sound money 
freedom to 
trade regulation 
summary 
index 
border I 0.74 0.48 0.63 0.76 0.94 0.57 
 G 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.45 
 C 0.37 0.34 0.06 0.49 0.26 0.50 
distance I 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96 
 G 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.26 0.24 0.20 
trade a) I 0.99 0.87 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.93 
 G 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 
 C 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.14 
GDP capita b) I 0.96 0.63 0.90 0.81 0.86 0.79 
 G 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.18 0.35 0.02 0.38 0.31 0.36 
legal origin I 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.95 0.72 0.89 
 G 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.29 0.41 0.27 
language c) I 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 
 G 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.33 
 C 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.27 0.26 0.23 
language fractionalisation d) I 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.22 
ethnic fractionalisation e) I 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 
 G 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.28 0.25 0.22 
religion d) I 0.92 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.99 
 G 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.26 0.22 0.20 
religious fractionalisation d) I 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 G 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.25 0.22 
religious polarisation f) I 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 
 G 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.33 
 C 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.27 0.25 0.23 
RQ polarisation h) I 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 
 G 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 
 C 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.24 0.22 
Notes: see Table 1. 
 
